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INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Amici are professors of tax law and economics at 
universities across the United States. As scholars 
and teachers, they have considered the economic 
consequences of this Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), and have 
concluded that Quill’s dormant Commerce Clause 
holding should be overruled. Amici join this brief 
solely on their own behalf and not as representatives 
of their universities. A full list of amici appears in 
Appendix A.1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
While the Supreme Court is rightly reluctant to 
overrule its own precedents under any 
circumstances, the force of stare decisis is less
powerful in some contexts than in others. 
Specifically, stare decisis exerts a weaker pull when 
judicial doctrine in the relevant area is based not on 
statutory interpretation but on changing competitive 
circumstances evolving
understandings. Antitrust law is a paradigmatic 
example of an area in which these conditions are 
met, but the argument for a flexible application of
and economic
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, petitioner and 
respondents have granted blanket consent to amicus briefs, and 
amici have provided notice to all parties of their intention to file 
this brief. None of the parties or their counsel authored any 
part of this brief in whole or in part or made any monetary 
contribution to fund the preparation or submission of the brief, 
and no person or entity other than amici and their counsel 
made such a monetary contribution to the preparation or 




precedent is similarly strong with respect to dormant 
Commerce Clause tax cases such as this one.
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court 
emphasized that its dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis was based on “structural concerns about the 
effect of state regulation on the national economy.” 
504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). The Court was especially 
concerned about the effect of taxation on the mail­
order industry, and it believed that maintaining the 
physical presence rule would “fosterG investment by 
businesses and individuals.” Id. at 315-18. It also 
believed that its rule would reduce compliance costs 
for businesses and individuals engaged in commerce 
across state lines. See id. at 313 n.6. For those 
reasons, the Court reaffirmed the physical presence 
rule first announced in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967).
The Court’s decision in Quill was predicated on 
then-current competitive circumstances and 
economic understandings. And in the quarter century 
since Quill, those circumstances and understandings 
have evolved. While the Quill Court was focused on 
the mail-order industry, it could not and did not 
foresee the meteoric rise of online retail, which has 
magnified the revenue losses that result from the 
physical presence rule. In the age of online retail, the 
physical presence rule has become a drag on 
economic efficiency and a potential impediment to 
investment across state lines. Meanwhile, the 
development of tax automation software over the 
past quarter century has led to a dramatic reduction 
in sales tax compliance costs for multistate 
retailers—so much so that overruling Quill would 
likely reduce aggregate compliance costs for
3individuals and firms seeking to abide by state tax 
laws.
Thus, to overrule Quill now based on changed 
competitive circumstances and evolving economic 
understandings would be to take it on its “own 
terms.” See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2401, 2413 (2015). It would be to acknowledge that— 
regardless of whether Quill was rightly decided at 
the time—the factual assumptions upon which it was 
based do not apply to the Internet age. The Court 
should grant South Dakota’s petition so it can revisit 
those assumptions and update its dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to a new 
technological and economic environment.
ARGUMENT
STARE DECISIS APPLIES WITH “LESS- 
THAN-USUAL FORCE” TO THE PHYSICAL 
PRESENCE RULE
I.
It is “never a small matter” for the Supreme 
Court to overrule its own precedent. See Kimble, 135 
S. Ct. at 2409. But it is a smaller matter in some 
areas of law than in others. For example, the Court 
“has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual 
force in cases involving the Sherman Act.” Id. at 
2412. The same reasons that justify a less rigid 
approach to precedent in the Antitrust context apply 
equally to dormant Commerce Clause tax cases such 
as this one.
The Court in Kimble identified a number of 
factors that determine the strength of stare decisis, 
and each of these factors favors a flexible application 
of precedent here. First, “stare decisis carries 
enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a
4statute”—and correspondingly weaker force when a 
decision does not. Id. at 2409. Dormant Commerce 
Clause rules are, of course, nonstatutory. And while 
Congress could in theory modify any rule rooted in 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, that fact 
alone has not stopped this Court from revising its 
dormant Commerce Clause precedents in the past. 
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989) 
(overruling Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. 
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966)); Dep’t of Revenue of 
Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 
734, 749-50 (1978) (overruling Joseph v. Carter & 
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) and 
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 
302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 
430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor 
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). Indeed, one 
objective of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
case law is “to eliminate the demand and necessity 
for sweeping national legislation.” See Dep’t of 
Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 365 (2008) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). .
Second, stare decisis is stronger where Congress 
intervenes with frequency—and thus where 
Congress’s decision not to supersede a judicial 
decision might be interpreted as acquiescence. See 
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409-10. In the area of state 
sales and use tax collection, congressional 
intervention is rare, and Congress cannot be said to 
have acquiesced to the Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause holding in Quill.2 To the contrary, the Senate
2 The last significant congressional act addressing nexus 
requirements for state tax collection came nearly six decades
5voted 69-27 in May 2013 to pass the Marketplace 
Fairness Act, which would have overturned Quill’s 
holding and allowed states to impose sales tax 
collection obligations on retailers with annual gross 
receipts in total remote sales exceeding $1 million 
nationwide. See S. 743, 113th Cong, (as passed by 
Senate, May 6, 2013). The Marketplace Fairness Act 
also enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the House 
of Representatives, but that chamber’s leadership 
refused to bring the bill to a floor vote. See Emma 
Durmain, Last-Ditch Push to Pass Marketplace 
Fairness Act in House Falls Short, Roll Call (Dec. 3, 
2014), https://perma.cc/5WM3-YY6Q. The failure of 
the Marketplace Fairness Act suggests—at most— 
that a handful of members of one house of Congress 
are reluctant to jettison the physical presence rule, 
but it does not indicate broad congressional support 
for the status quo.
Third, stare decisis is more powerful with respect 
to precedents that generate significant reliance 
interests. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410 
(“[Considerations favoring stare decisis are at their 
acme” in “cases involving property and contract 
rights” because “parties are especially likely to rely 
on such precedents when ordering their affairs” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But 
importantly, the Court has said that only a 
“legitimate reliance interest”' will warrant judicial 
accommodation. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
|
ago with the Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 
73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391). That legislation 
concerned income tax collection rather than the sales and use 
tax collection issues implicated by Quill.
6798, 824 (1982) (noting that “the doctrine of stare 
decisis does not preclude” overruling precedent when 
“it is clear that no legitimate reliance interest can be 
frustrated by our decision” (emphasis added)). While 
other dormant Commerce Clause precedents may 
engender legitimate reliance interests, the physical 
presence rule has not. As long as consumers comply 
with state tax law, there is no tax advantage in 
purchasing goods from out-of-state vendors because 
consumers must pay use taxes when vendors fail to 
collect sales taxes.3 Thus, insofar as consumers and 
vendors have come to rely on the tax evasion 
opportunities that the physical presence rule avails, 
that reliance interest is illegitimate because it is 
based on noncompliance with valid use tax laws.
Fourth and finally, stare decisis is at its weakest 
when the relevant area of law is explicitly based on 
changing competitive circumstances and evolving 
economic understandings. As the Court in Kimble 
explained, stare decisis operates with diminished 
force in the context of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
because -
!
Congress . . . intended that law’s 
reference to “restraint of trade” to have
3 Taxes collected and remitted by out-of-state vendors are 
sometimes denominated as “sales taxes” and sometimes as “use 
taxes.” Compare State v. Wayfair Inc., 2017 S.D. 56, f5 (2017) 
(decision below) (describing tax that South Dakota requires out- 
of-state vendors to remit as “sales tax”), with Quill, 504 U.S. at 
301 (describing tax that North Dakota sought to require out-of­
state vendors to remit as “use tax”). The brief refers to taxes 
collected and remitted by vendors as “sales taxes” to distinguish 
them from “use taxes” remitted by consumers.
7changing content, and authorized courts 
to oversee the term’s dynamic potential.
We have therefore felt relatively free to 
revise our legal analysis as economic 
understanding evolves and ... to 
reverse antitrust precedents that 
misperceived a practice’s competitive 
consequences. Moreover, because the 
question in those cases was whether the 
challenged activity restrained trade, the 
Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its 
understanding 
Accordingly, to overturn the decisions in 
light of sounder economic reasoning was 
to take them on their own terms.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2412-13 (alterations, citations, 
and internal quotation marks omitted).
The central question in dormant Commerce 
Clause tax cases is not far from the question in the 
Sherman Act context: whether a challenged tax “is, 
in effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce 
among the States.” Walling u. Michigan, 116 U.S. 
446, 455 (1886). The Court often relies on economic 
analysis to answer that question. See, e.g., 
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. 
Ct. 1787, 1803-04 (2015); W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 
512 U.S. 186, 195 n.10 (1994). Quill itself is an
. t:
example. There, the Court explained that “the 
Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are 
informed ... by structural concerns about the effects 
of state regulation on the national economy.” Quill, 
504 U.S. at 312. In particular, the Court suggested 
that the physical presence requirement had 
supported the growth of the mail-order retail 
industry, and that maintaining the rule would
of economics.
8“fosterQ investment by businesses and individuals.” 
See id. at 316. The Court was especially concerned 
about the cost to small vendors of complying with 
sales tax obligations imposed by each of “the Nation’s 
6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions.” See id. at 313 n.6. 
Its decision to reaffirm the physical presence 
requirement rested on its understanding of the rule’s 
economic effects. Thus, to overturn Quill “in light of 
sounder economic reasoning” would be to take the 
decision “on [its] own terms.” Cf. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2413.4
THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE QUILL 
IN LIGHT OF CHANGED COMPETITIVE 
CONDITIONS AND EVOLVING ECONOMIC 
UNDERSTANDINGS
II.
While Quill was largely based on “structural 
concerns” about the effect of state taxation on the 
“national economy,” those same concerns now cut 
against the physical presence rule. Four negative 
effects of the physical presence requirement merit 
emphasis. First, the physical presence rule poses a 
much more serious threat to the fiscal stability of 
state and local governments than the Quill Court 
could have anticipated. Second, the rule results in 
economically inefficient consumption choices to an 
extent that the Quill Court could not have foreseen. 
Third, the physical presence rule distorts firms’ 
decisions about production, distribution, and
4 Overruling Quill’s dormant Commerce Clause holding would 
still leave in place the limits on state taxing power imposed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Quill, 
504 U.S. at 307-08.
9corporate structure in ways that perversely 
discourage businesses from expanding across state 
lines. Fourth and finally, the physical presence rule 
likely raises the aggregate cost to consumers and 
businesses of complying with state sales and use tax 
laws.
A. Revenue Losses Resulting from the 
Physical Presence Rule Have 
Skyrocketed Since Quill
The revenue losses to state and local governments 
as a result of the physical presence rule far exceed 
anything that the Quill Court could have imagined— 
most notably because the Quill Court could not and 
did not foresee the rise of Internet retail. The Court 
in Quill was confronted with revenue-loss estimates 
of up to $3.27 billion per year across all 50 states.5 
Now, the best available estimate pegs the revenue 
loss to state and local governments as a result of the 
physical presence requirement at $33.9 billion in 
2018, rising to $51.9 billion by 2022.6 Accounting for
5 Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Gov’rs Ass’n et al. in Supp. of Resp. 
24 n.13, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 666 (reporting $3.27 
billion estimate for 1992 (citing Advisory Comm'n on 
Intergovernmental Relations, State Taxation of Interstate Mail­
Order Sales: Revised Revenue Estimates, 1990-1992, at 2 
(1991))); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Ariz. Mail Order Co. et 
al. in Supp. of Pet’r 34 & n.40, Quill v. North Dakota, No. 91­
194, 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 537 (filed Nov. 21, 1991) 
(“Recent estimates of revenue loss range from $694 million to $3 
billion per year.”).
6 Marketplace Fairness Coalition, $221 Billion in Lost Revenue 
Over the Next 5 Years, https://perma.cc/5YDL-WAZW (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2017).
10
inflation, the revenue impact of Quill has jumped 
roughly six-fold since the time that Quill was argued 
and decided, with further increases yet to come.7
States effectively have two ways to make up for 
that revenue loss.8 One is to cut spending on public 
goods and services. The other is to raise taxes on 
income, property, and sales made by retailers who 
maintain a physical presence within the state. Yet 
higher taxes on a narrower base generally reduce 
economic growth more than lower taxes on a broader 
base. For this reason, excluding online and other 
remote transactions from the sales tax base likely 
decreases the overall efficiency of state tax systems. 
See William F. Fox, Retail Sales and Use Taxation, in 
The Oxford Handbook of State and Local 
Government Finance 406, 415-16, 422-23 (Robert D. 
Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012).
The fiscal cost of the physical presence 
requirement is especially significant given that Quill 
itself rested on the premise that interstate commerce 
generally “may be required to pay its fair share of 
state taxes.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 n.5. Online 
retailers unquestionably benefit from state and local 
government investment in transportation and 
broadband infrastructure. Allowing these vendors to
7 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2017).
8 Forty-six states are subject to constitutional or statutory 
balanced budget requirements of varying force. See Nat’l Ass’n 




avoid state and local sales taxes is at odds with the 
“fair share” principles underlying the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause tax cases. See Or. Waste 
Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102 
(1994) (“It was not the purpose of the commerce 
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate 
commerce from their just share of state tax burdens.” 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 281 (“[T]he Court 
consistently has indicated that interstate commerce 
may be made to pay its way . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).
Thus, what at the time of Quill looked like a 
relatively narrow exemption for a mail-order 
industry of modest size has grown to be a gaping hole 
in state and local sales and use tax bases. As Justice 
Kennedy has noted, “Quill now harms States to a 
degree far greater than could have been anticipated 
earlier.” Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 
1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). These 
revenue consequences are one—though not the 
only—reason that the Court should reconsider its 
physical presence rule.
The Physical Presence Rule Leads to 
Economically Inefficient Consumption 
Choices
In the age of online retail' the physical presence 
rule reduces economic efficiency in ways that were 
not apparent at the time of Quill. When that case 
was decided, there was little evidence to suggest that 
consumers were changing their purchasing decisions 
in order to circumvent state and local sales taxes. See 
Michael L. Klassen, Karen Glynn & Kathleen Porter, 
Sales Tax Effects on Mail Order Consumer
B.
12
Purchasing Decisions, 8 J. Direct Marketing 21, 22 
(1994) (noting “a paucity of research on the subject of 
state sales tax effects on consumer behavior in mail 
order purchasing decisions”). Thus, there was little 
reason to believe that the differential taxation of in­
state and out-of-state retailers distorted consumer 
decisionmaking to an economically significant 
degree.
Now, however, peer-reviewed economic research 
has demonstrated that a significant share of online 
shoppers alter their purchasing patterns so that they 
can evade state and local sales and use taxes. See, 
e.g., Austan Goolsbee, In a World Without Borders: 
The Impact of Taxes on Internet Commerce, 115 Q. J. 
Econ. 561, 568 (2000) (estimating that as many as 24 
percent of online shoppers would purchase offline if 
not for the opportunity to circumvent state and local 
sales taxes); James Aim & Mikhail I. Melnik, Sales 
Taxes and the Decision to Purchase Online, 33 Pub. 
Fin. Rev. 184, 186 (2005) (putting that figure at 6 
percent); Liran Einav et al., Sales Taxes and Internet 
Commerce, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 3 (2014)
(estimating that “on average, the application of a 10 
percent sales tax reduces purchases by 15 percent 
among buyers who clicked on an item” on eBay). If 
online retailers had collected sales taxes on those 
transactions, a large number of consumers would 
have switched to brick-and-mortar stores instead. 
Moreover, consumers are much more likely to alter 
their online purchasing patterns than to change their 
mail-order purchasing decisions in response to sales 
tax collection. See Eric T. Anderson et al., How Sales 
Taxes Affect Customer and Firm Behavior: The Role 
of Search on the Internet, 47 J. Marketing Research 
229, 239 (2010) (finding that after a retailer begins
13
collecting state sales taxes, “Internet orders decrease 
by 11.6%” but “there is no apparent effect on catalog 
orders”). In other words, the physical presence rule 
appears to distort the decisions of online shoppers 
much more than it distorted the decisions of mail­
order customers—a phenomenon that can be 
attributed to the fact that comparison-shopping is 
much easier online than via catalog. See id. at 236.
The distortion of consumer purchasing patterns 
resulting from the physical presence rule has 
negative consequences for economic efficiency. See 
Austan Goolsbee, The Implications of Electronic 
Commerce for Fiscal Policy (and Vice Versa), 15 J. 
Econ. Perspectives 13, 19 (2001). The Congressional 
Budget Office offers the following example to 
illustrate the negative economic consequences that 
result from consumers altering their purchasing 
patterns in order to circumvent state and local sales 
taxes:
For example, a consumer might choose 
to purchase books over the Internet for 
$100 inclusive of the shipping cost, pay 
no sales tax, and fail to comply with the 
use tax rather than purchase the same 
books at a local bookstore for $102 
inclusive of a local $5 sales tax. The real 
resource cost of the books . . . purchased 
from the Internet seller is $100 ... . The 
real resource cost of the same books . . . 
available for sale from the local 
bookseller is $97 .... Thus, the tax 
differential that results from the 
consumer’s noncompliance with the use 
tax causes this consumer to make a 
choice that increases the production
14
costs of books by $3. That money 
represents a loss of economic well-being 
to society because those $3 worth of 
resources could have been used to 
produce $3 worth of other goods or 
services.
Cong. Budget Office, Economic Issues in Taxing 
Internet and Mail-Order Sales, at 8 (Oct. 2003).
In sum, the physical presence rule leads 
consumers to make purchasing decisions that 
increase overall production costs—and those extra 
costs are, from society’s perspective, pure waste. The 
result is that a doctrine motivated by “structural 
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the 
national economy” instead undermines economic 
well-being. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. The Quill 
Court could not have perceived the full economic- 
efficiency costs of the physical presence rule because 
it could not have foreseen that the rule would distort 
the behavior of online shoppers so much more than it 
affected the purchasing patterns of catalog 
customers. Cf. Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2413 (Court 
“relatively free” to reverse precedent “that 
misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences”). 
Stare decisis does not prevent the Court from 
correcting that error.
C. The Physical Presence Rule 
Discourages Vendors from Expanding 
Across State Lines
Beyond the distortion of consumers’ purchasing 
decisions, the physical presence rule leads vendors to 
make inefficient decisions regarding production, 
distribution, and corporate structure. More 
specifically, the physical presence rule discourages
i
15
vendors from expanding their operations into new 
states when doing so would trigger sales tax 
collection obligations in additional jurisdictions. See 
Anderson et al., supra, at 238-39 (analyzing store 
expansion decisions of 14 retailers over 3 years and 
finding strong evidence that physical presence rule 
causes retailers to avoid opening stores in new states 
with sales taxes). This not only has negative effects 
on economic well-being but also undermines the 
dormant Commerce Clause’s objective of promoting 
interstate economic activity.
The early years of Amazon.com provide a 
particularly vivid illustration of the “extreme 
measures” some companies take to avoid collecting 
state sales taxes. See Stu Woo, Amazon Battles States 
Over Sales Taxes, Wall St. J. (Aug. 3, 2011). The 
company reportedly distributed color-coded maps and 
spreadsheets to employees highlighting states that 
employees should avoid on business travel for fear 
that a physical presence—even if temporary—might 
trigger sales tax collection obligations. The company 
stopped recruiting at business schools in some states, 
and employees reportedly refrained from sending 
work-related e-mails if they ended up in a state 
where the company did not collect sales taxes. See 
id.9
Amazon and other companies have taken a 
number of further steps to avoid sales tax collection
9 Amazon now collects sales taxes in all states that have one, 
but it does not require third-party sellers on its site to collect 
state sales taxes. See Linda Qiu, Does Amazon Pay Taxes? 
Contrary to Trump Tweet, Yes, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 2017).
■I
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obligations in additional jurisdictions. In some cases, 
they have shut down warehouses for fear that a 
physical presence in a state might trigger sales tax 
liability. See, e.g., Jay Greene, Amid Rapid 
Expansion, Amazon to Shutter Kansas Warehouse, 
Seattle Times (Oct. 1, 2014). In other cases, 
companies have split off their Internet businesses so 
that ownership of brick-and-mortar stores would not 
force the firm to collect sales taxes online. See Erik 
Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless 
Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and 
Conventional Retailers, 46 Mgmt. Sci. 563, 570 
(2000). In many of these instances, firms are 
adopting inefficient distribution strategies and 
corporate structures solely for tax avoidance 
purposes. The resources that they devote to these 
efforts rather than to more productive ends 
constitute a deadweight loss to the national economy.
Worse yet, by discouraging firms from expanding 
across state lines, the physical presence rule 
undermines the dormant Commerce Clause’s goal of 
promoting “economic union.” See Dennis v. Higgins, 
498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
When the physical presence rule causes a company to 
split off its operations in another state or to shutter 
its operations across state lines, it contributes to the 
very “economic Balkanization” that dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine strives to avoid. See 
Camps Newfound / Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 577 (1997). This marks one 
more way in which the Quill Court misperceived—or 
failed to foresee—the economic consequences of its 






D. The Physical Presence Rule Likely 
Raises the Aggregate Cost of 
Complying with State Sales and Use 
Tax Laws
Finally, the physical presence rule—which the 
Quill Court thought would reduce the cost of 
complying with state tax laws—likely has the exact 
opposite effect. The Quill Court expressed concern 
about the “administrative and record-keeping 
requirements [that] could entangle a mail-order 
house” if it were subject to sales tax obligations in 
every jurisdiction. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6 
(alterations omitted). But what the Quill Court failed 
to appreciate is that the physical presence rule does 
not make those administrative and recordkeeping 
burdens go away. It merely shifts those burdens from 
vendors to consumers, who are then left to comply 
with use tax obligations on their own.
In the years since Quill, vendors have gained 
access to sophisticated tax automation software that 
dramatically reduces the cost of complying with sales 
tax obligations in multiple jurisdictions. See Joe 
Crosby & Diane Yetter, No Excuses: Automation 
Advances Make Sales Tax Collection Easier for 
Everyone, 85 State Tax Notes 571, 575, 580 (Aug. 7, 
2017) (concluding that in light of technological 
advances that post-date Quill, “even if a sales tax 
applied to every individual sale in every jurisdiction .
. . , robust sales tax compliance would still be 
reasonably possible for all businesses at prices 
commensurate with their other regulatory 
obligations.”); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Retail 
Sales Tax Compliance Costs: A National Estimate— 
Volume One: Main Report 18 (2006) (finding—in 





nexus states did not necessarily result in higher sales 
tax compliance costs”). For $20 per month or less, 
small businesses can automate their sales tax
preparation for every state. See Avalara, Avalara 
TrustFile: Pricing, https://perma.cc/S65G-2WRP (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2017); TaxJar, Pricing,
https://perma.cc/VR3V-J9N4 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2017). Amazon also offers to calculate and remit 
sales taxes for sellers on its Marketplace platform for 





https://perma.cc/A654-H9NR (last visited Oct. 30, 
2017).i°
There has been no comparable technological 
transformation that has slashed compliance costs for 
consumers seeking to comply with their use tax 
obligations. Consumers still must track all of their 
purchases over the course of the year, determine 
when the vendor has collected sales tax and when it 
has not, and then calculate the use tax due on each 
item. Even the most fastidious personal 
recordkeepers will face difficult challenges in 
interpreting and applying state and local use tax 
laws that impose different rates on different 
products.
It is safe to assume, then, that the cost of 
complying with state sales and use tax obligations
10 In addition, a majority of states now allow vendors to retain a 
small percentage of the sales taxes they collect in order to 
partially offset compliance costs. See Fed’n of Tax Adm’rs, State 




will be lower if the compliance burden is borne by 
vendors than if it is shouldered by consumers. 
Vendors generally enjoy scale economies and access 
to technologies that most consumers cannot match. 
To be sure, many consumers will incur no compliance 
costs because they will simply disregard their 
jurisdiction’s use tax laws. See Nina Manzi, Use Tax 
Collection on Income Tax Returns 10 (Minn. House of 
Representatives, Research Dep’t, Policy Brief, Apr. 
2015) (noting that fewer than 2 percent of taxpayers 
reported use tax on state income tax returns in 
2012). But insofar as the Court’s concern is to make 
it easier for individuals and firms to comply with the 
law, that concern weighs against the physical 
presence rule’s retention. By overruling Quill, the 
Court would reallocate the compliance burden from 
consumers—who are ill-equipped to handle it—and 
to the vendors that are generally in a much better 
position to calculate and pay state sales taxes.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ 
of certiorari should be granted.
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APPENDIX A
Amici are listed below in alphabetical order. Their 
institutional affiliations are provided for 
identification purposes only.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan Law School
Joseph Bankman, Ralph M. Parsons Professor of 
Law and Business, Stanford Law School
Jordan M. Barry, Professor of Law, University of 
San Diego School of Law
Lily Batchelder, Professor of Law and Public 
Policy, New York University School of Law
John R. Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center
Samuel D. Brunson, Professor of Law, Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law
J. Clifton Fleming, Ernest L. Wilkinson Chair and 
Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University
i:
David Gamage, Professor of Law, Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law
Ari Glogower, Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law




Andrew J. Haile, Associate Professor of Law, Elon 
University School of Law
Daniel Hemel, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago Law School
David Herzig, Professor of Law and Michael and 
Dianne Swygert Research Fellow, Valparaiso 
University Law School
!
Hayes Holderness, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Richmond School of Law
Calvin H. Johnson, John T. Kipp Chair in 
Corporate and Business Law, University of Texas 
School of Law
Richard L. Kaplan, Guy Raymond Jones Chair in 
Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
College of Law
Michael S. Knoll, Theodore K. Warner Professor, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Zachary Liscow, Associate Professor of Law, Yale 
Law School
Yair Listokin, Shibley Family Fund Professor of 
Law, Yale Law School
Ruth Mason, Class of 1957 Research Professor of 
Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Assistant Professor of 
Law, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law
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Orly Mazur, Assistant Professor of Law, Southern 
Methodist University Dedman School of Law
Susan C. Morse, Professor of Law, University of 
Texas School of Law
Richard Pomp, Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law, 
University of Connecticut School of Law
James R. Repetti, William J. Kenealy, S.J. 
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School
Julie A. Roin, Seymour Logan Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago Law School
Daniel Schaffa, Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Richmond School of Law
Daniel N. Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professor of 
Taxation, New York University School of Law
Jay Soled, Professor, Rutgers Business School
Erin Scharff, Associate Professor of Law, Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University
Sloan Speck, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Colorado Law School
Kirk J. Stark, Barrall Family Professor of Tax 
Law and Policy, University of California at Los 
Angeles Law School
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John A. Swain, Chester H. Smith Professor of 
Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of 
Arizona
Adam Thimmesch, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Nebraska College of Law
Manoj Viswanathan, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of California Hastings College of Law
Edward Zelinsky, Morris and Annie Trachman 
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law, Yeshiva University
Eric M. Zolt, Michael H. Schill Distinguished 
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